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Abstract: 
This paper studies the impact of the tax incentive prescribed in the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on individuals' long-term care insurance purchasing behavior. Using data 
from the Health and Retirement Study, we find that the tax incentive in HIPAA increased the take-up rate of 
private LTC insurance by 3.3 percentage points, or 25%, for those eligible. Despite this seemingly strong 
response, our results imply that even an above-the-line tax deduction would not increase the coverage rate of 
seniors beyond 13%, indicating that tax incentives alone are unlikely to expand the market substantially. We 
also present, to our knowledge, the first estimate of the price elasticity of demand for LTC insurance of around 
− 3.9, suggesting that demand is highly elastic at the current low ownership rate. Finally, we evaluate the net 
fiscal impact of the tax incentive and find that the tax deductibility of LTC insurance premiums leads to a net 
revenue loss for the government, as the reduced tax revenue from granting the tax incentive exceeds the savings 
in Medicaid's LTC expenditures. 
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Article: 
1. Introduction 
The long-term care needs of seniors have been placing great financial pressure on the U.S. public insurance 
program Medicaid in recent years. In 2004, Medicaid paid 42% of the nation's spending on long-term care 
($158 billion) and 43% of its spending on nursing homes ($115 billion) (Kaiser, 2006a). These numbers will 
likely rise dramatically since the share of the population above age 85 is expected to triple in the next four 
decades (Census Bureau, 2004). How to ease the burden on Medicaid of the seniors' long-term care needs has 
drawn a great deal of public attention and been the subject of heated policy debates (Abt Associates, 2001).1 
One option is to use tax incentives to expand the market for private long-term care (hereafter LTC) insurance, 
which currently covers only about 10% of the elderly population above age 65 and paid about 8% of the nation's 
total LTC expenditures and 9% of the nation's nursing home bills in 2004 (Kaiser, 2006b). 
 
Governments at both the federal and state levels have implemented tax incentives to stimulate the private LTC 
insurance market. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) gave favorable tax 
treatment to private LTC insurance, allowing it to be treated as health insurance when calculating an 
individual's federal income tax liability. For the vast majority of the population, LTC insurance premiums can 
therefore be counted as medical expenses for the purpose of itemized deductions. 
 
This paper presents, to our knowledge, the first evidence of how people responded to the tax incentive in 
HIPAA, as well as the first estimate of the price elasticity of demand for LTC insurance. The fact that only 10% 
of the elderly have LTC insurance a decade after HIPAA was passed suggests that the act has not dramatically 
increased the size of the market. Nonetheless, calculating how much of the current market size can be attributed 
to HIPAA is useful because it allows us to estimate what the impact would be of a more widespread policy, 
such as an above-the-line deduction. 
 
A priori, it is not clear whether the tax incentive provided by HIPAA should have an impact on people's LTC 
insurance purchasing decisions. On one hand, the demand for LTC insurance may not be responsive to price 
changes due to potential underlying limiting factors.2 In particular, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) argue that 
Medicaid may crowd-out the demand for private LTC insurance for up to the 60th percentile of the wealth 
distribution. Moreover, individuals are allowed to deduct only the portion of their medical expenses above 7.5% 
of their adjusted gross income (AGI). This stringent requirement suggests that the deductibility of medical 
expenses may apply only in years when one experiences unexpected negative health shocks. If the deductibility 
of medical expenses is largely unpredictable, favorable tax treatment contingent on medical itemizing status 
might not affect an individual's purchasing decision. 
 
On the other hand, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) also point out that the very existence of Medicaid crowd-out 
suggests that prospective LTC insurance buyers are price sensitive, which may imply that the change in relative 
prices induced by HIPAA may in fact have affected purchasing. Moreover, for people in the age range for 
making LTC insurance purchasing decisions, deductibility of medical expenses is much more predictable than it 
is for the average population.3 
 
This ambiguity suggests that whether or not tax incentives affect LTC insurance purchasing decisions is an 
empirical issue. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we aim to answer three questions: 1) 
Did people respond to the tax incentive prescribed in HIPAA; 2) What is the price elasticity of demand for LTC 
insurance; and 3) What was the effect of the tax incentive on net government revenues? 
 
We answer the first question by exploiting the fact that, since HIPAA allows individuals to deduct LTC 
insurance premiums as medical expenses, only those who itemize medical expenses are eligible for the tax 
break. We estimate a difference-in-differences model, defining the treatment group as individuals who itemized 
medical expenses in the pre-treatment year and the control group as those who did not itemize medical expenses 
in the pre-treatment year and would not have been able to do so even if they had owned a deductible policy. We 
use itemizing status in the pre-treatment year instead of that in the current year to avoid reverse causality: in the 
post-treatment years, individuals who owned LTC insurance were more likely to itemize medical expenses 
since the premium of the policy could then be counted as medical expenses. 
 
We find that HIPAA increased the ownership rate of LTC insurance by 3.3 percentage points, or 25%, for those 
eligible for the tax treatment. While this effect seems substantial, it implies that HIPAA increased the total 
market size of LTC insurance by less than half a percentage point. An extrapolation of our result suggests that 
an above-the-line tax deduction would expand the coverage rate of seniors from the current 10% to only 13.3%. 
Our findings are consistent with the argument in the literature that Medicaid crowd-out limits the potential size 
of the private LTC insurance market ([Brown and Finkelstein, 2008], [Brown and Finkelstein, 2007] and 
[Brown et al., 2007]). 
 
We estimate the price elasticity of LTC insurance by exploiting the fact that, for individuals who do itemize 
medical expenses, the size of the tax break depends on their federal marginal income tax rate. Using an 
instrumental variables estimator, we estimate an elasticity of around −  3.9, suggesting that the current market 
for private LTC insurance is very price elastic in the local range of low baseline ownership rates. 
 
Finally, we conduct a fiscal impact analysis to examine the effect of the tax incentive on net government 
revenues. We find that the foregone tax revenue exceeds the savings for Medicaid, suggesting that it may not be 
fiscally wise to use tax subsidies to expand the private LTC insurance market. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information about LTC, LTC 
insurance, and the policy intervention prescribed in HIPAA. Section 3 describes the data, outlines the empirical 
identification strategy and reports the results. Section 4 conducts robustness checks. Section 5 estimates the 
price elasticity of LTC insurance demand. Section 6 conducts the fiscal impact analysis. Finally, section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. LTC and LTC insurance 
LTC refers to a range of medical, personal, and/or social services designed to support the needs of individuals 
living with disability or chronic health conditions. Nursing homes provide institutional LTC to individuals who 
need assistance with Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), such as eating, dressing, bathing, transferring to and out 
of bed, toileting, and continence. In 2000, almost 6 million seniors above age 65 in the U.S. needed LTC 
services, and about 1.5 million seniors were nursing home residents (Kaiser, 2006b). The average risk of 
utilizing a nursing home is high, and there is a considerable right tail in the risk distribution.4 Nursing home 
stays are very expensive, with the national average monthly rate of a semi-private room being $5280 in 2005 
(Metlife, 2005). Without some sort of insurance, this can quickly drain the financial resources of an ordinary 
elderly U.S. household. Theoretically, the large right tail in the risk distribution combined with the high cost 
associated with the risk should make insurance very desirable (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). 
 
There are two ways to insure one's LTC expenditure risks. The public insurance program Medicaid has been the 
major payment source for the nation's LTC needs, covering about 43% of total nursing home expenditures and 
42% of total LTC expenditures (Kaiser, 2006a). However, an individual has to be indigent or exhaust almost all 
her income and a substantial amount of her assets to meet Medicaid's means-tested eligibility requirements for 
LTC coverage. Norton (2000) describes Medicaid's nursing home coverage as insurance with a deductible equal 
to one's assets and a co-pay equal to one's income. 
 
Private LTC insurance is an alternative way to insure LTC expenditure risks. The market for private LTC 
insurance is small, as only about 10% of seniors above age 65 owned a policy in 2004. The benefit structure of 
a typically-purchased policy is limited, providing a daily-capped benefit of $100, compared to a national 
average daily cost of $143 in 2000 (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008). 
 
There has been a wide range of explanations for the limited market size of private LTC insurance. Potential 
supply-side factors include asymmetric information, imperfect competition, high administrative costs, and the 
undiversifiable intertemporal risk of rising health care costs. Potential demand-side factors include limited 
individual rationality, misconceptions about the extent of public insurance, informal care provided by family 
and friends, and Medicaid crowd-out (see Norton, 2000 for a review). A series of papers by (Brown and 
Finkelstein, 2008) and (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007) and Brown et al. (2007) emphasize the role of Medicaid 
crowd-out in explaining the limited size of the private LTC insurance market. In particular, the authors estimate 
that, despite its limited benefit structure, Medicaid crowds out demand for private LTC insurance up to the 60th 
percentile of the wealth distribution (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008). 
 
2.2. The tax treatment of LTC insurance in HIPAA 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) provides the same favorable tax 
treatments for qualified LTC insurance that exist for health insurance, effective January 1, 1997.5,6 The resulting 
tax incentive differs for different types of individuals. First, for employer-sponsored LTC insurance, an 
employee can exclude from her taxable income the employer's contribution to the premium.7 Second, self-
employed individuals can deduct above-the-line a portion of their LTC insurance premiums, up to certain 
maximum caps.8 This portion was 45% when HIPAA was first passed and was increased to 60% in 2001, 70% 
in 2002, and 100% in 2003 (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2001). Third, LTC insurance premiums not eligible 
for exclusion or above-the-line deduction can be treated as medical expenses for the purpose of itemized 
deductions, up to certain maximum caps.9 The focus of our analysis is the tax treatment in the form of the 
medical expenses deduction since this is applicable to the general population. From now on, our use of “tax 
incentive” refers to the deductibility of LTC insurance as a medical expense, unless stated otherwise. We briefly 
discuss the tax incentive on LTC insurance purchased by the self-employed in the robustness check section. 
 
An individual must satisfy two conditions to deduct medical expenses. First, she has to choose to claim itemized 
deductions instead of taking the standard deduction. An individual will presumably choose whichever gives her 
a higher amount of total deductions when filing the tax return. Second, given that an individual has chosen to 
itemize deductions, she can itemize only the amount of total unreimbursed medical expenses above 7.5% of her 
adjusted gross income (AGI). The latter requirement can be quite stringent since 7.5% of AGI is a high floor for 
most adults. However, since health problems become more common as one ages, the elderly and near-elderly 
who are the typical purchasers of LTC insurance are much more likely to itemize medical expenses than the 
general population. Indeed, 14% of our sample itemized medical expenses. 
 
For a medical expenses itemizer, the tax subsidy granted by HIPAA lowers the effective price of LTC insurance 
relative to non-tax-deductible consumption. If an individual's marginal federal income tax rate is τ and she 
receives a full deduction on her LTC insurance premium, the effective relative price of her LTC insurance 
policy is 1 − τ. For example, consider an individual with a marginal federal income tax rate of 25% who has 
$1000 to spend on either non-deductible consumption or LTC insurance. If she spends this $1000 on LTC 
insurance and she can fully deduct the premium, she will receive $250 in tax subsidies, meaning that purchasing 
the $1000 policy costs her only $750 in terms of foregone consumption. Therefore, the relative price of the 
deductible LTC insurance policy is 0.75, or one minus the marginal tax rate. This reduction in the relative price 
would be expected to increase the quantity of insurance demanded. 
 
3. Data description and empirical strategy 
3.1. Data and summary statistics 
We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally representative longitudinal survey conducted 
biennially since 1992. HRS contains rich information on demographics, family structure, financial status, 
insurance status, and health status. Our analysis mainly utilizes the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 waves of 
data. The LTC insurance coverage data seems to suffer from substantial reporting errors in the earlier waves of 
1992 and 1994.10 We will therefore only use the 1992 and 1994 waves in some of the robustness checks and 
falsification tests. 
 
We limit our analysis to the HRS cohort, which consists of individuals born between 1931 and 1941.11 The HRS 
and AHEAD cohorts are the only cohorts included in the HRS prior to the enactment of HIPAA in 1997. 
Following Brown et al. (2007), we do not use the AHEAD cohort since these people had passed the primary age 
range for purchasing LTC insurance when HIPAA took effect. 
 
We obtain most of our data from the RAND version of HRS, including LTC insurance ownership status, 
household income and wealth, mortgage payment, property tax, out-of-pocket medical expenses, demographics, 
and a detailed set of variables on health status.12 Other variables come from the original HRS data set, including 
itemizing status, medical itemizing status, charitable contributions, and insurance premiums.13 Table 1 presents 
summary statistics of the relevant variables. 
 
Table 1.  
Summary statistics 
Variable name Entire sample Medical 
itemizers 
Non-medical 
itemizers 
Difference 
LTC insurance 0.105 (0.004) 0.120 (0.009) 0.103 (0.005) 0.017 (0.010)  
Medical itemizer 0.134 (0.006) – – – 
Majority itemizer 0.010 (0.005) – – – 
Variable name Entire sample Medical 
itemizers 
Non-medical 
itemizers 
Difference 
Itemizer 0.496 (0.011) – – – 
Self-employed 0.127 (0.004) 0.206 (0.133) 0.114 (0.004) 0.092 (0.014)*** 
Marginal tax rate 0.232 (0.002) 0.248 (0.003) 0.229 (0.002) 0.019 (0.003)*** 
Household income 71,580 (2129) 85,299 (4215) 68,918 (2144) 16,381 (4244)*** 
Household wealth 360,431 
(14,322) 
514,174 
(52,775) 
335,494 (13,700) 178,680 
(53,599)*** 
Married 0.750 (0.006) 0.816 (0.014) 0.739 (0.007) 0.077 (0.016)*** 
Male 0.476 (0.004) 0.477 (0.012) 0.476 (0.004) 0.002 (0.0132) 
White 0.867 (0.007) 0.882 (0.010) 0.863 (0.008) 0.018 (0.009)** 
Age 55–60 0.484 (0.005) 0.489 (0.014) 0.483 (0.006) 0.006 (0.016) 
Age 60–65 0.420 (0.006) 0.425 (0.015) 0.419 (0.007) 0.006 (0.167) 
Age 65–70 0.052 (0.002) 0.049 (0.007) 0.052 (0.002) − 0.003 (0.007) 
Age over 70 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) − 0.000 (0.001) 
High school graduate 0.362 (0.007) 0.346 (0.017) 0.364 (0.008) − 0.018 (0.019) 
Some college 0.194 (0.006) 0.241 (0.133) 0.186 (0.007) 0.055 (0.015)*** 
College graduate 0.198 (0.009) 0.253 (0.018) 0.190 (0.010) 0.063 (0.018)*** 
High blood pressure 0.379 (0.006) 0.395 (0.015) 0.378 (0.006) 0.017 (0.014) 
Diabetes 0.111 (0.003) 0.113 (0.010) 0.111 (0.003) 0.002 (0.011) 
Cancer 0.070 (0.003) 0.089 (0.009) 0.067 (0.003) 0.023 (0.010)** 
Heart disease 0.141 (0.005) 0.151 (0.013) 0.139 (0.004) 0.012 (0.013) 
Arthritis 0.446 (0.007) 0.433 (0.019) 0.448 (0.008) − 0.015 (0.021) 
Spouse: High blood pressure 0.260 (0.006) 0.293 (0.016) 0.255 (0.007) 0.038 (0.017)** 
Spouse: Diabetes 0.075 (0.003) 0.099 (0.010) 0.070 (0.003) 0.029 (0.010)* 
Spouse: Cancer 0.055 (0.003) 0.081 (0.008) 0.051 (0.003) 0.030 (0.007)*** 
Spouse: Heart disease 0.105 (0.003) 0.139 (0.010) 0.099 (0.003) 0.040 (0.012)*** 
Spouse: Arthritis 0.306 (0.007) 0.320 (0.015) 0.303 (0.007) 0.016 (0.016) 
Bathe 0.030 (0.002) 0.038 (0.006) 0.029 (0.002) 0.009 (0.006) 
Eat 0.015 (0.002) 0.017 (0.004) 0.014 (0.002) 0.003 (0.004) 
Variable name Entire sample Medical 
itemizers 
Non-medical 
itemizers 
Difference 
Dress 0.063 (0.003) 0.062 (0.006) 0.063 (0.003) − 0.001 (0.009) 
Walk 0.035 (0.002) 0.033 (0.005) 0.035 (0.002) − 0.002 (0.005) 
Bed 0.048 (0.003) 0.043 (0.005) 0.049 (0.002) − 0.006 (0.006) 
Toilet 0.026 (0.002) 0.029 (0.004) 0.026 (0.002) 0.003 (0.006) 
Spouse: Bathe 0.019 (0.001) 0.029 (0.005) 0.017 (0.002) 0.011 (0.006)* 
Spouse: Eat 0.011 (0.001) 0.018 (0.004) 0.010 (0.001) 0.008 (0.005)* 
Spouse: Dress 0.038 (0.002) 0.048 (0.007) 0.036 (0.003) 0.012 (0.007)* 
Spouse: Walk 0.021 (0.002) 0.026 (0.005) 0.020 (0.002) 0.006 (0.005) 
Spouse: Bed 0.029 (0.002) 0.037 (0.007) 0.027 (0.002) 0.010 (0.008) 
Spouse: Toilet 0.016 (0.001) 0.026 (0.005) 0.014 (0.002) 0.012 (0.005)** 
Map 0.204 (0.008) 0.143 (0.010) 0.213 (0.008) − 0.070 
(0.010)*** 
Phone 0.020 (0.002) 0.011 (0.003) 0.022 (0.002) − 0.011 
(0.004)*** 
Money 0.049 (0.003) 0.046 (0.007) 0.049 (0.003) − 0.003 (0.008) 
Medications 0.094 (0.006) 0.067 (0.007) 0.099 (0.007) − 0.031 
(0.009)*** 
Shopping 0.076 (0.004) 0.072 (0.008) 0.077 (0.004) − 0.005 (0.008) 
Meals 0.067 (0.003) 0.067 (0.008) 0.067 (0.003) − 0.000 (0.007) 
Spouse: Map 0.132 (0.005) 0.126 (0.010) 0.133 (0.005) − 0.006 (0.013) 
Spouse: Phone 0.016 (0.001) 0.017 (0.005) 0.016 (0.001) 0.002 (0.005) 
Spouse: Money 0.036 (0.002) 0.039 (0.007) 0.035 (0.002) − 0.003 (0.007) 
Spouse: Medications 0.063 (0.005) 0.064 (0.007) 0.063 (0.002) − 0.001 (0.009) 
Spouse: Shopping 0.050 (0.003) 0.063 (0.010) 0.048 (0.003) 0.015 (0.011) 
Spouse: Meals 0.053 (0.003) 0.064 (0.007) 0.052 (0.003) 0.013 (0.008) 
Memory 2.933 (0.014) 2.842 (0.028) 2.947 (0.015) − 0.105 
(0.029)*** 
Self-reported health condition 2.572 (0.021) 2.510 (0.046) 2.582 (0.022) − 0.073 (0.049) 
Spouse: Self-reported health 
condition 
1.838 (0.021) 2.050 (0.044) 1.80 (0.024) 0.025 (0.053)*** 
Notes: Based on wave 1996 of the HRS cohort. The first three columns report means and standard deviations. 
The last column reports the mean differences between medical itemizers and medical non-itemizers, with 
corresponding standard errors. ***indicates a difference statistically significant at the 1% level; **5% level; 
*10% level. The statistics are weighted by HRS individual sampling weights of 1996. 
 
Fig. 1 shows the LTC insurance ownership rates across our sample among individuals who itemized medical 
expenses and those who did not. In 1996, prior to the institution of HIPAA, the difference in ownership rates 
between the medical itemizers and medical non-itemizers was 1.7 percentage points, and the 95% confidence 
intervals for the two groups overlap. The difference was similar in 1998, shortly after HIPAA took effect. After 
1998, the gap between the medical expenses itemizers and non-itemizers began to rise steadily, reaching about 
10 percentage points in 2004. The average difference in ownership rates after HIPAA took effect was about 7 
percentage points. Excluding 1998, the average difference rises to about 9 percentage points. Our empirical 
strategy examines how much of this correlation between policy ownership and itemizing status is due to the 
causal effect of HIPAA. 
 
 
 
3.2. Identification strategy 
The tax benefit on LTC insurance prescribed by HIPAA applies to the entire population and thus does not give 
rise to clear-cut treatment and control groups. Any individual is eligible for the tax benefit if she chooses to take 
itemized deductions and to itemize medical expenses, so we encounter a selection into treatment problem. We 
address this issue by relying on a difference-in-differences approach, which controls for all factors that are 
constant over time and might jointly determine the outcome of interest and the decision to itemize medical 
expenses. This approach also allows us to include a detailed set of health covariates to control for the possible 
effect of changes in health status over time on the decision to acquire LTC insurance. 
 
An additional concern is reverse causality, as individuals who own LTC insurance policies may be more likely 
to itemize medical expenses in the post-treatment years than those who do not, ceteris paribus. Since HIPAA 
allows LTC insurance premiums to count as medical expenses, policy-owners have higher deductible medical 
expenses than those who do not own a policy, giving them a higher probability of reaching the 7.5% AGI floor. 
To address this potential problem, we use medical itemizing status and general itemizing status (whether a 
person takes itemized deductions or the standard deduction) in the pre-treatment year 1996 to define the 
treatment and control groups.14 Since LTC insurance premiums were not tax deductible in 1996, individuals 
who owned policies then were not more likely than others to itemize medical expenses, ceteris paribus. 
Classifying on the basis of itemizing status in the pre-treatment year 1996 represents an intention-to-treat 
analysis. 
 
We divide the sample into four groups according to pre-treatment itemizing status and relevant measures of 
medical expenses.15 In our analysis, “treatment” refers to eligibility for the tax subsidy, based on pre-treatment 
behavior. Group 1 is “the fully-treated treatment group,” containing 1461 individuals who itemized medical 
expenses in the pre-treatment year 1996. These people should expect to be eligible for the full tax benefit when 
LTC insurance becomes deductible. Group 2 consists of individuals with a level of medical expenditures in 
1996 high enough to benefit from the tax incentive, but who elected to take the standard deduction. We define a 
“high enough” level of medical expenditures as having total unreimbursed medical expenses exceeding 7.5% of 
the AGI floor after adding a hypothetical LTC insurance premium. These individuals may or may not be 
eligible for the tax incentive after LTC insurance becomes deductible. On one hand, if adding a LTC insurance 
premium to medical expenditures induces them to itemize deductions instead of taking the standard deduction, 
they would be able to itemize medical expenses and receive the tax benefit on at least a portion of the LTC 
insurance premium. On the other hand, if their other deductible expenses (mortgage interest payments, etc.) are 
low enough that owning a deductible LTC insurance policy would not change their general itemizing decision, 
they would not be eligible for the tax treatment.16 We refer to group 2, which consists of 2593 individuals, as 
the “possibly-treated treatment group.” Since medical expenditures tend not to be the main driver of individuals' 
decision regarding whether to take the standard deduction or itemize deductions, we suspect that group 2 will 
behave more similarly to the control group (defined below) than to the treatment group. Group 3 includes 
individuals who itemized deductions but did not itemize medical expenses in 1996, because their total 
unreimbursed medical expenses fell short of the 7.5% AGI floor, but whose medical expenses would have 
exceeded 7.5% of their AGI if we add a hypothetical LTC insurance premium. We expect those in this group to 
receive a “partial” tax treatment since they would only be able to itemize the portion of the premium that 
exceeds the 7.5% floor. Therefore, we name group 3, which contains 218 individuals, the “partially-treated 
treatment group.” Group 4 consists of the rest of the sample: individuals who did not itemize medical expenses 
in 1996 and whose total unreimbursed medical expenses would not have reached the 7.5% floor even if a 
hypothetical LTC insurance premium was added. Those individuals would not be eligible for any tax benefit, so 
their LTC insurance purchasing decision should not be affected by HIPAA, making them a clean control group. 
The control group contains 4294 individuals. Fig. 2 provides an illustration of the four groups.17 
 
 
  We estimate the following difference-in-differences regression: 
 
LTCIit = a0 + yt + bi + a1TXi*POSTt + XitB + eit        (1) 
 
where LTCIit indicates whether individual i owns LTC insurance in year t; yt is a year fixed effect; and bi is an 
individual fixed effect. TXi is the treatment status indicator, equal to 1 if individual i is in the treatment group 
and 0 if she is in the control group; the treatment group can be any of the three aforementioned groups or a 
combination of them as explained below. POSTt indicates whether the current time period is post-treatment 
(after 1997), and TXi * POSTt gives the treatment status of individual i at time t. Xit is a set of control variables 
including household income, household wealth, marital status, dummies for age groups, and 37 variables for 
health status.18,19 The health status variables indicate whether the respondent and her spouse have chronic health 
conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, heart disease, and arthritis), limitations on activities of daily 
living (ADLs) (bathing or showering, eating, dressing, walking, getting into or out of bed, and toileting) and 
instrumental ADLs (using a map, using a phone, managing money, taking medications, shopping, and preparing 
meals), as well as self-reported measures of their health status and memory capacity.20 We first estimate model 
(1) without controls, then add financial and demographic controls, then finally add the health control variables. 
Since our regressions include individual fixed effects, we do not include controls for race, gender, and 
education. 
 
The parameter of interest is a1, which measures the effect of being ‘eligible’ for the HIPAA subsidy on the 
probability of owning an LTC insurance policy. The difference-in-differences estimator of a1 is consistent under 
the maintained assumption of strict exogeneity of the treatment status. This assumption would be violated, for 
example, if there are differential trends in LTC insurance ownership rates between medical itemizers and non-
medical itemizers. One particular concern is that medical itemizers may be sicker than non-medical itemizers, 
increasing their demand for LTC insurance over time and biasing our estimate of a1 upward. Alternatively, 
individuals with pre-existing health conditions, limitations with ADLs or IADLs, or cognitive impairments may 
not be eligible to purchase LTC insurance or face high prices that limit purchasing, in which case our estimate 
of a1 could be biased downward. We therefore include controls for health conditions, limitations on ADLs and 
IADLs, and memory capacity in an attempt to control for these potential sources of bias in our estimates. 
 
The last column of Table 1 reports whether the health control variables differ systematically by medical 
itemization status in the pre-treatment year 1996. Medical itemizers do appear to have a higher prevalence rate 
for certain diseases than non-medical itemizers. However, out of the 25 ADLs, IADLs, and cognitive variables 
that most directly reflect demand for and access to LTC insurance, only eight differences are significant at the 
10% level, among which medical itemizers score better in four of them while the non-itemizers score better in 
the other four. We therefore do not conclude that medical itemizers and medical non-itemizers differ 
systematically in terms of the health variables that would most directly influence LTC ownership. Moreover, 
our use of individual fixed effects removes time-invariant sources of bias that may result from these differences, 
and we examine further the possibility of differential trends in LTC ownership between medical itemizers and 
non-itemizers in section 4. 
 
Given the theoretical ambiguity about the response of groups 2 and 3 to HIPAA, we estimate model (1) with 
different treatment groups: the fully-treated treatment group, the possibly-treated treatment group, the partially-
treated treatment group, and a “generally-treated” treatment group consisting of both fully- and partially-treated 
individuals. We expect that the average treatment effect will be highest for the fully-treated group and lowest 
for the possibly-treated group. In all regressions, we exclude individuals who were self-employed and did not 
itemize medical expenses in 1996, since they were treated through a mechanism other than itemization 
behavior. 
 
3.3. Results 
In regressions not reported (but available upon request), we examine the short-run effect of HIPAA using 1998 
as the only post-treatment year. Our estimate of a1 is practically zero, implying that people did not respond to 
the tax incentive immediately after HIPAA was installed. A lag before impact is not surprising since diffusion 
of information regarding a policy change can be gradual. Since HIPAA did not take effect until January 1st, 
1997, we suspect that many people first found out about the favorable tax treatment on LTC insurance in early 
1998, while reading the instructions on their 1997 tax returns. Furthermore, the decision to purchase LTC 
insurance typically involves a long-term commitment to pay a premium for many years before starting to 
receive benefits.21 It should therefore involve careful thought, calculations, and comparisons, all of which take 
time. Finally, premiums often cost $1000 per year or more. The large expense associated with purchasing LTC 
insurance may cause time to pass before individuals respond to tax incentives for two reasons. First, they need 
time to accumulate the financial resources necessary to make a purchase. Second, those who are healthy may 
decide that purchasing LTC insurance is a good idea, but postpone actually making the purchase until they feel 
that there is a reasonable chance that they will need LTC services. 
 
We therefore examine the longer-run impact by excluding 1998 from the sample and using 2000, 2002, and 
2004 as the post-treatment years.22 Table 2 reports the main results of the paper, those from the difference-in-
differences regression (1) with the fully-treated treatment group as the treatment group in columns (1)–(4). 
Column (1) does not include any control variables except for the individual fixed effects and the year dummies. 
Column (2) includes real household income, real household wealth, marital status, and the age group dummies 
(hereafter partial controls).23 Column (3) adds a set of 37 controls for health conditions, ADLs, IADLs, and 
memory capacity (hereafter full controls). The estimates of the parameter of interest a1 are very similar across 
specifications regardless of the controls added. The point estimate in the regression with full controls is 0.033 
and significant at the 5% level. This implies that the fully-treated individuals increased their likelihood of 
owning a LTC policy by 3.3 percentage points after HIPAA was installed, relative to the control group. This 
magnitude represents a 25% increase from the baseline ownership rate of LTC insurance among the fully-
treated individuals in 1996 (13%). These results suggest that individuals ‘eligible’ for the tax treatment do 
respond to the incentive. Although this effect appears large, the tax treatment in HIPAA did not increase the 
total size of the LTC insurance market substantially. Since only about 14% of the individuals in our sample 
itemized medical expenses in 1996, a 3.3 percentage point increase in the ownership rate for them would 
translate into less than half a percentage point increase in the ownership rate for the population as a whole. 
 
 
Table 2.  
Difference-in-differences regressions 
 Fully-treated treatment group 
 
Possibly 
treated 
 
Partially 
treated 
 
Generally 
treated 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
Treatment *Post 0.029 
(0.014) 
** 
0.027 
(0.014)* 
0.033 
(0.015)** 
0.037 
(0.015)** 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.032) 
0.028 
(0.014)** 
Household income – 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
− 0.000 
(0.000) 
− 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Household wealth – 0.000 
(0.000)* 
0.000 
(0.000)* 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000)** 
Married – 0.022 
(0.016) 
0.017 
(0.026) 
0.017 
(0.027) 
− 0.019 
(0.025) 
− 0.006 
(0.030) 
0.013 
(0.027) 
Age 55–60 – − 0.037 
(0.028) 
− 0.045 
(0.030) 
− 0.047 
(0.030) 
− 0.033 
(0.029) 
− 0.026 
(0.033) 
− 0.035 
(0.030) 
Age 60–65 – − 0.057 
(0.030)* 
− 0.068 
(0.032)** 
− 0.069 
(0.033)** 
− 0.053 
(0.031)* 
− 0.051 
(0.036) 
− 0.063 
(0.033)* 
Age 65–70 – − 0.036 
(0.034) 
− 0.045 
(0.036) 
− 0.044 
(0.037) 
− 0.039 
(0.035) 
− 0.038 
(0.040) 
− 0.047 
(0.037) 
Age over 70 – − 0.041 
(0.038) 
− 0.046 
(0.041) 
− 0.045 
(0.041) 
− 0.047 
(0.039) 
− 0.037 
(0.046) 
− 0.046 
(0.042) 
High blood 
pressure 
– – 0.020 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
Diabetes – – 0.002 
(0.017) 
− 0.001 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
− 0.008 
(0.018) 
 Fully-treated treatment group 
 
Possibly 
treated 
 
Partially 
treated 
 
Generally 
treated 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
Cancer – – − 0.033 
(0.016)* 
− 0.037 
(0.017)** 
− 0.035 
(0.015)* 
− 0.022 
(0.018) 
− 0.022 
(0.016) 
Heart disease – – − 0.012 
(0.016) 
− 0.012 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
− 0.017 
(0.018) 
− 0.013 
(0.017) 
Arthritis – – 0.021 
(0.012)* 
0.021 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
Spouse: High 
 blood pressure 
– – − 0.018 
(0.013) 
− 0.021 
(0.013) 
− 0.015 
(0.012) 
− 0.006 
(0.015) 
− 0.014 
(0.013) 
Spouse: Diabetes – – 0.002 
(0.019) 
0.000 
(0.019) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
0.009 
(0.022) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
Spouse: Cancer – – 0.036 
(0.019)* 
0.038 
(0.019)** 
0.026 
(0.019) 
0.026 
(0.023) 
0.030 
(0.020) 
Spouse: Heart 
disease 
– – 0.011 
(0.017) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
0.025 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.020) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
Spouse: Arthritis – – 0.006 
(0.014) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
Bathe – – − 0.037 
(0.020) 
− 0.034 
(0.021) 
− 0.015 
(0.014) 
− 0.017 
(0.024) 
− 0.021 
(0.020) 
Eat – – − 0.002 
(0.025) 
0.030 
(0.026) 
− 0.013 
(0.018) 
− 0.017 
(0.027) 
− 0.005 
(0.024) 
Dress – – − 0.004 
(0.014) 
− 0.009 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
− 0.007 
(0.014) 
Walk – – 0.008 
(0.019) 
− 0.016 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.022) 
− 0.002 
(0.019) 
Bed – – 0.020 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.020) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.020) 
0.022 
(0.017) 
Toilet – – − 0.031 
(0.019) 
− 0.027 
(0.021) 
− 0.009 
(0.013) 
− 0.045 
(0.022)** 
− 0.029 
(0.020) 
Spouse: Bathe – – − 0.010 
(0.023) 
− 0.011 
(0.024) 
− 0.018 
(0.019) 
− 0.030 
(0.027) 
− 0.020 
(0.023) 
Spouse: Eat – – − 0.030 
(0.029) 
− 0.034 
(0.033) 
0.019 
(0.024) 
0.018 
(0.033) 
− 0.016 
(0.028) 
 Fully-treated treatment group 
 
Possibly 
treated 
 
Partially 
treated 
 
Generally 
treated 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
Spouse: Dress – – 0.020 
(0.018) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
0.021 
(0.017) 
0.040 
(0.023)* 
0.022 
(0.019) 
Spouse: Walk – – 0.017 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.023) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.029) 
0.018 
(0.023) 
Spouse: Bed – – 0.011 
(0.021) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
0.028 
(0.027) 
0.008 
(0.023) 
Spouse: Toilet – – 0.009 
(0.023) 
0.016 
(0.025) 
− 0.024 
(0.020) 
− 0.019 
(0.030) 
0.007 
(0.025) 
Map – – − 0.008 
(0.010) 
− 0.009 
(0.010) 
− 0.007 
(0.008) 
− 0.014 
(0.011) 
− 0.010 
(0.010) 
Phone – – 0.001 
(0.011) 
− 0.007 
(0.021) 
− 0.020 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.020) 
− 0.009 
(0.019) 
Money – – 0.014 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
0.016 
(0.014) 
Medications – – 0.020 
(0.016) 
0.023 
(0.017) 
0.024 
(0.014)* 
0.009 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
Shopping – – 0.008 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
− 0.002 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
Meals – – 0.005 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
− 0.000 
(0.010) 
− 0.005 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
Spouse: Map – – 0.007 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
− 0.005 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
Spouse: Phone – – − 0.019 
(0.022) 
− 0.023 
(0.022) 
− 0.008 
(0.016) 
− 0.006 
(0.026) 
− 0.002 
(0.022) 
Spouse: Money – – − 0.012 
(0.016) 
− 0.011 
(0.016) 
− 0.007 
(0.015) 
− 0.021 
(0.019) 
− 0.011 
(0.016) 
Spouse: 
Medications 
– – 0.008 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.019) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
0.012 
(0.021) 
0.009 
(0.019) 
Spouse: Shopping – – 0.004 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
− 0.010 
(0.014) 
− 0.005 
(0.018) 
− 0.002 
(0.016) 
Spouse: Meals – – − 0.003 
(0.014) 
− 0.004 
(0.015) 
− 0.009 
(0.014) 
− 0.011 
(0.017) 
− 0.009 
(0.015) 
 Fully-treated treatment group 
 
Possibly 
treated 
 
Partially 
treated 
 
Generally 
treated 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
Memory – – − 0.004 
(0.004) 
− 0.006 
(0.005) 
− 0.000 
(0.004) 
− 0.000 
(0.005) 
− 0.004 
(0.005) 
Self-reported 
 health condition 
– – − 0.003 
(0.004) 
− 0.004 
(0.004) 
− 0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
− 0.003 
(0.004) 
Spouse: self-
reported health 
condition 
– – − 0.001 
(0.005) 
− 0.000 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
− 0.001 
(0.005) 
# of observations 19,061 19,061 17,344 16,662 18,167 12,813 16,362 
Adjusted R2 0.401 0.402 0.403 0.406 0.401 0.407 0.408 
Dependent variable = LTC insurance ownership. 
Treatment group = fully-treated treatment group. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; **5% level; *10% 
level. Individual and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Observations are weighted using the HRS 
individual sampling weights of 1996. Self-employed individuals who did not itemize medical are excluded. 
 
An extrapolation of this estimate to the general population suggests that allowing for an above-the-line 
deduction of LTC insurance premiums would increase the take-up rate of LTC insurance by 3.3 percentage 
points for the taxpayers. Assuming that all individuals pay income taxes, such a policy would expand the LTC 
insurance ownership rate of seniors from the current 10% to 13.3%. Our results therefore imply that the 
potential of tax incentives to expand the LTC insurance market is quite limited, consistent with the notion in the 
literature that public policies designed to stimulate the private LTC insurance market would have a limited 
effect ([Brown and Finkelstein, 2008], [Brown and Finkelstein, 2007] and [Brown et al., 2007]). 
 
In column (4), we report the estimates from the same specification as column (3) but excluding individuals who 
received Medicaid benefits in any of the waves of our data. The coefficient estimate of 0.037 is slightly larger 
than the estimates in the first three columns, which is expected since those who had used Medicaid would most 
likely rely on public insurance for their LTC needs and thus not purchase LTC insurance regardless of the tax 
incentive. 
 
The remaining three columns of Table 2 report the results when the treatment group is the possibly-treated 
treatment group, the partially-treated treatment group, and the generally-treated treatment group. The possibly-
treated treatment group appears to behave very similarly to the control group. The response of the partially-
treated treatment group is positive but small and statistically insignificant, which is not surprising since this 
group would be able to deduct only a portion of their LTC insurance purchase. Accordingly, the results for the 
generally-treated treatment group are slightly weaker than those for the fully-treated group. The coefficient of 
interest, however, remains statistically significant. 
 
4. Robustness checks and falsification tests 
4.1. Matching on pre-treatment characteristics 
Our maintained assumption in the difference-in-differences specification is that the treatment and control 
groups have the same trends in LTC purchasing behavior over time. As a test of the validity of this assumption, 
we estimate the parameter of interest by implementing a set of generalized matching estimators. Matching 
estimates are less susceptible to the criticism of differential time trends because the treatment group and the 
control group should be more likely to have the same unobservable trend if they are comparable in terms of 
observable characteristics. 
 
We implement the matching estimation as follows. First, we collapse the data in the post-treatment periods 
(years 2000, 2002, and 2004) into a single period by averaging the variables in Eq. (1) over the three periods. 
We then take the difference between the collapsed post-treatment data and pre-treatment data, transforming the 
data into a cross-section. Next, we match the control group to the fully-treated treatment group on the common 
support using both kernel and k-nearest neighborhood matching based on propensity score. The propensity 
score is the predicted probability of itemizing medical expenses in the pre-treatment year 1996, obtained 
through a probit regression of medical itemizing status in 1996 on gender, race, education, and the full set of 
controls used in regression (1). 
 
Table 3 displays the results. Column (1) reports the first-difference estimate of the transformed cross-sectional 
data on the common support. Columns (2)–(4) show results from kernel matching with the kernel being 
Epanechnikov, biweight, and normal distributions, respectively. Columns (5) to (7) are results from the k-
nearest neighborhood matching with k = 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The results from the first-difference 
estimation, the kernel matching, and the nearest neighborhood matching with k = 1 are very similar to the fixed 
effects estimates.24 The nearest neighborhood matching results with k = 2 and k = 3 are not as similar, but are 
still well within the 95% confidence intervals of the fixed effects estimates. 
 
Table 3.  
Matching estimation 
 First-
difference 
 
Kernel density matching 
 
k-nearest neighborhood 
matching 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
Treatment 
*post 
0.034 
(0.016)** 
0.033 
(0.015)** 
0.033 
(0.015)** 
0.032 
(0.015)** 
0.035 
(0.020)* 
0.017 
(0.017) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
Controls Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 
# of 
observations 
4417 4417 4417 4417 4417 4417 4417 
R2 0.013 – – – – – – 
Dependent variable = LTC insurance ownership. 
Treatment group = fully-treated treatment group. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; **5% level; *10% 
level. Individual and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Observations are weighted using the HRS 
individual sampling weights of 1996. Self-employed individuals who did not itemize medical are excluded. The 
STATA module psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) is used to implement the matching procedure. 
 
4.2. Falsification tests 
We further examine the validity of our identification assumption of no differential trends between the treatment 
and control groups by examining the pre-treatment trends among the medical itemizers and non-medical 
itemizers. We estimate regression (1) with the full set of controls, defining the treatment group as individuals 
who itemized medical expenses in 1992 and the control group as those who did not itemize medical expenses in 
1992 and did not qualify as partially- or possibly-treated. The treatment and control groups here correspond to 
the fully-treated and control groups in Section 3. We restrict the sample to 1992 and 1994, and consider 1992 to 
be the pre-treatment year and 1994 the post-treatment year. Since no actual treatment occurred between 1992 
and 1994, a significant estimate would provide evidence that medical itemizers have a different time trend in 
their LTC insurance take-up than the non-medical itemizers, and that our estimates in Section 3 may be biased. 
A potential problem with this falsification test is that, as discussed earlier, the LTC ownership rates in waves 
1992 and 1994 are too low to be reliable, possibly as a result of the less-than-ideal context under which the 
relevant survey questions were asked. We therefore suspect that our dependent variable in the falsification test 
contains considerable measurement error. 
 
We also consider three variations of this falsification test. First, we use 1992 as the pre-treatment year and 1996 
as the post-treatment year, and classify the treatment and control groups on the basis of itemization status and 
medical expenses in 1992. Similarly, we use 1994 as the pre-treatment year and 1996 as the post-treatment year. 
Finally, to be most consistent with our use in Section 3 of one pre-treatment year and multiple post-treatment 
years, we use 1992 as the pre-treatment year and 1994 and 1996 as post-treatment years. 
 
We present the results in Table 4. The coefficient estimates of TX * POST are statistically insignificant and 
small in magnitude in all four tests, supporting our identification assumption that the time trends of the 
treatment and control groups are the same. Nonetheless, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that there 
was a general shift in demand between these groups in the post-treatment periods. In particular, HIPAA's 
legitimization of the LTC insurance market, apart from the tax incentive, may have increased demand most 
strongly among the sickest individuals, who may be most likely to itemize medical expenses. 
 
Table 4.  
Falsification tests 
 1992 and 1994 1992 and 1996 1994 and 1996 1992 and 1994–96 
Treatment *post − 0.010 (0.006) − 0.007 (0.015) − 0.010 (0.016) − 0.009 (0.009) 
Controls Full Full Full Full 
# of observations 9605 9871 5159 14,596 
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.125 0.196 0.186 
Dependent variable = LTC insurance ownership. 
Treatment group = fully-treated treatment group. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Individual and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
Observations are weighted using the HRS individual sampling weights of 1996. Self-employed individuals who 
did not itemize medical are excluded. 
 
4.3. HIPAA's impact on the LTC insurance purchasing decision by the self-employed 
As another robustness check, we explore a different treatment mechanism provided by HIPAA. Specifically, we 
examine how HIPAA affects the LTC insurance purchasing decision of the self-employed. As discussed 
previously, HIPAA allows self-employed individuals to deduct above-the-line a portion of their LTC insurance 
premiums, allowing for a straightforward definition of the treatment and control groups. However, we have less 
confidence in the validity of the strict exogeneity assumption, since self-employed individuals and employees 
likely differ in terms of risk tolerance, possibly resulting in differential time trends in LTC insurance ownership. 
Nonetheless, studying the behavior of the self-employed serves as a useful robustness check. 
 
We estimate the difference-in-differences regression Eq. (1) defining the treatment group as individuals who 
were self-employed in 1996 and the control group the same as that in the main analysis. This approach is similar 
to that used by Gruber and Poterba (1994) in their study of the elasticity of health insurance. 
 
Columns (1)–(3) of Table 5 report the results. The coefficient estimate of the parameter of interest in the 
regression with full controls is 0.030 and significant at the 10% level. This suggests that the self-employed 
increased their ownership of LTC insurance by 3.0 percentage points, relative to those who did not receive any 
tax treatment on LTC insurance. This incentive effect is slightly smaller in magnitude and less significant than 
the effect found on medical itemizers, which is reasonable since self-employed individuals were allowed to 
deduct only a portion of their insurance premiums until 2003.25 
 
Table 5.  
Results for the self-employed and majority itemizers 
 Self-employed vs. non-self-employed 
non-medical itemizers 
 
Itemized medical in majority of pre-
treatment years as treatment group 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Treatment 
*post 
0.023 
(0.014)* 
0.022 
(0.014)* 
0.030 
(0.016)* 
0.028 
(0.015)* 
0.027 
(0.015)* 
0.031 
(0.015)** 
Controls – Partial Full – Partial Full 
# of 
observations 
18,805 18,805 16,960 26,389 26,389 24,149 
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.397 0.398 0.410 0.412 0.412 
Dependent variable = LTC insurance ownership. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; **5% level; *10% 
level. Individual and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Observations are weighted using the HRS 
sampling weights of 1996. In columns (1)–(3), non-self-employed individuals who were classified as 
“generally-treated,” “partially-treated,” or “possibly-treated” in the main analysis are excluded. In columns 
(4)–(6), individuals who are self-employed in the majority of years and did not itemize medical expenses in the 
majority of years are excluded. 
 
4.4. Using medical expenses itemizing status in the majority of pre-treatment years to define treatment groups 
Recall that we define our treatment and control groups in Section 3 based on an individual's 1996 itemizing 
status and measures of her medical expenses. Although the correlation of medical itemizing status between 
consecutive years is 0.5 in our sample, using a single year's medical itemizing status to classify the treatment 
and control groups might be misleading. Some individuals who do not normally itemize medical expenses may 
have itemized in 1996 due to a negative health shock. Such individuals may not respond to the tax incentive 
since they would not expect to be eligible in most years. The reverse may also be true for some individuals 
classified into the control group in our main analysis. 
 
As a robustness check, we define our treatment groups slightly differently. We use medical itemizing status and 
total medical expenses in the majority of the pre-treatment years 1992, 1994, and 1996 to define an alternative 
classification of the sample into treatment and control groups. An individual is fully treated if she itemized 
medical expenses in two or three of the three pre-treatment years. She is partially treated if she meets the 
aforementioned qualifications for partial treatment in two of the three pre-treatment years. Similarly, she is 
possibly treated if she meets the qualifications for possible treatment in at least two of the three years. The rest 
of the sample is in the control group. This “majority” approach of defining the treatment and control groups 
attempts to account for the possibility that individuals' expected future itemizing status may be based on their 
typical itemizing status in the past, as opposed to whether or not they itemized in a single year. Columns (4)–(6) 
of Table 5 report the results. Reassuringly, they are similar to our main results. 
 
5. Elasticity of LTC insurance 
In this section, we estimate the price elasticity of demand for LTC insurance. Although an extensive literature 
has estimated the elasticity of various acute health insurances (see Gruber, 2001 for a review), to our knowledge 
our paper is the first to do so for LTC insurance. 
 
The tax treatment effectively changes the relative price of LTC insurance relative to ordinary consumption that 
is not tax deductible. Therefore, we estimate the following fixed effects tax price regression: 
 
LTCIit=a0+yt+bi+γ1taxpriceit+XitB+eit        (2) 
 
where yt, bi and Xit are defined as before. We set taxpriceit equal to 1 for the entire sample in the pre-treatment 
period 1996. In the post-treatment periods, we assign those who itemized medical expenses in period t a 
taxpriceit equal to 1 − τ, where τ is the individual's marginal federal income tax rate. taxpriceit remains equal to 
1 for those who did not itemize medical expenses.26 Dividing the estimate of the semi-elasticity parameter γ1 by 
the medical itemizers' baseline ownership rate gives an estimate of the tax price elasticity of LTC insurance. 
 
In addition to the measurement error in constructing the variable taxprice, reverse causality is another potential 
identification problem when estimating Eq. (2). When LTC insurance is tax-deductible, individuals who own a 
LTC insurance policy are more likely to itemize medical expenses and thus receive a taxprice equal to one 
minus their marginal tax rate. We address these potential problems through an instrumental variable approach. 
We instrument for the endogenous variable taxprice with ite_med96 * POST, where ite_med96 is an indicator 
variable for whether individual i itemized medical expenses in the pre-treatment year 1996.27 As discussed in 
Section 3, ite_med96 * POST is based on pre-treatment behavior and therefore not susceptible to reverse 
causality. It is also correlated with taxprice since ite_med96 is correlated with current medical itemizing status, 
which affects taxprice. We also use a set of instruments including ite_med96 * POST, ite_med96 * POST * sex, 
and ite_med96 * POST * edu, where sex is an indicator for whether the individual is male, and edu is the 
individual's number of years of education. Interacting ite_med96 * POST with gender and education generates 
more variation in the predicted value of taxprice than from using only ite_med96 * POST. The set of 
instruments therefore has the potential to give more precise estimates. 
 
Table 6 reports the results from the tax price regressions. The first column presents the OLS results. The 
direction of the potential bias in the OLS estimates is not apparent since the variable taxprice contains non-
classical measurement errors. Columns (1)–(3) report the IV results using the single instrument 
ite_med96 * POST; columns (1)′–(3)′ report the IV results using the set of instruments defined above. In all 
three regressions with the set of instruments, an overidentification test of the validity of the set of instruments 
fails to reject the null hypothesis. The IV coefficient estimates associated with the variable taxprice range from 
− 0.44 to − 0.51; all are significant at the 5% level. The estimates from the specifications with full controls 
translate to an elasticity of −  3.9, given the baseline LTC ownership rate of 13% among medical expenses 
itemizers in our sample in 1996.28 These results imply that demand for LTC insurance is very price elastic, at 
least within a local range of low ownership rates. The large elasticity that we obtain is consistent with the 
answer to one of the HRS survey questions, which indicates that high premiums are the main reason that 
individuals choose to cancel a LTC insurance policy. Note that we do not advise direct comparison between this 
elasticity estimate and the elasticity estimates of acute health insurance in the literature, which are much lower, 
ranging from −  0.6 to − 1.8 (Cutler, 2002). This is because the underlying market structures of LTC insurance 
and acute health insurance are very different. In particular, the baseline ownership rate of acute health insurance 
is usually 60–70% or higher ([Gruber and Poterba, 1994] and [Gruber, 2001]). It is possible that responsiveness 
to price changes would be much weaker if the market for LTC insurance were as nearly satiated. 
 
Table 6.  
Fixed effects tax price regressions 
 OLS 
 
IV 
 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(1)′ 
 
(2)′ 
 
(3)′ 
 
Tax price − 0.221 
(0.050)*** 
− 0.480 
(0.198)** 
− 0.447 
(0.198)** 
− 0.513 
(0.208)** 
− 0.469 
(0.198)** 
− 0.442 
(0.198)** 
− 0.503 
(0.205)** 
Controls Full – Partial Full – Partial Full 
p-value of 
overidentificaton 
test 
– – – – 0.306 0.269 0.618 
# of observations 17,269 17,975 17,975 16,316 17,924 17,885 16,289 
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.004 0.008 0.010 
Dependent variable = LTC insurance ownership. 
Treatment group = fully-treated treatment group. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; **5% level; *10% 
level. Individual and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Observations are weighted using the HRS 
individual sampling weights of 1996. Self-employed individuals who did not itemize medical are excluded. 
Regressions in Columns (1)′–(3)′ are estimated using the STATA module xtivreg2 (Schaffer and Stillman, 2007). 
 
An additional concern with the tax price regressions is that income determines marginal tax rate and may also 
influence LTC purchasing decisions, meaning that failing to completely control for income may bias estimates 
of γ1. We experiment with different approaches to modeling the income effect, including linear, polynomials up 
to the fifth power, and a set of dummies for 5-percentile groups. Our findings are very robust to all approaches, 
so we only present the results from the linear specification. 
 
A final concern with our elasticity estimates is that we ignore the state tax incentives installed in some states. 
However, we do not expect that these are as important as the federal incentive since state income tax rates are 
much lower than the federal ones. Moreover, omitting them should not systematically bias our results in a 
particular direction. 
 
6. Net fiscal impact of the tax subsidy 
In this section, we evaluate the net fiscal impact of implementing the tax incentive on LTC insurance in HIPAA. 
From a pure fiscal point of view, the cost to the government is the loss in tax revenue, while the saving is the 
reduction in Medicaid LTC expenditures. We develop equations for the cost and saving and calibrate the model 
using parameters imputed from the HRS and AHEAD cohorts of the HRS as well as from the existing literature. 
We find that the loss in tax revenue exceeds the savings on Medicaid funds by almost $150 per senior, using 
conservative estimates of the former and possibly exaggerated estimates of the latter. 
 
6.1. Loss in tax revenue 
We begin by estimating the loss in tax revenue resulting from the tax incentive. The loss in tax revenue is the 
expected total tax subsidies to be granted to those eligible, the medical itemizers who own LTC insurance. It 
therefore equals the discounted sum of expected annual tax subsidies among the medical itemizers who own 
LTC insurance, multiplied by the probability of an individual being a medical itemizer and owning a policy. 
Formally, a representative senior who purchases a LTC insurance policy in the base year t = 0 and holds it for T 
years can expect to receive a total tax subsidy S of 
 
 
 
where τ is the marginal tax rate and X is the annual premium for medical itemizers who own LTC insurance, 
with an annual real growth rate of x. P(I) is the probability of itemizing medical expenses. P(L) is the 
probability of owning LTC insurance among the medical itemizers, and r is the discount rate. 
 
We obtain parameter values as follows. We assume τ = 0.21, X = $2063, P(L) = 0.19, and P(I) = 0.16 based on 
the weighted sample averages in the post-treatment periods from the HRS cohort.29 We also assume x = 0.029.30 
We further assume T = 17, i.e. an individual holds LTC insurance for 18 years.31 Throughout our analysis in this 
section, we use a discount rate of 0.03.32 
 
The resulting tax subsidy per senior is therefore 
 
 
 
Implementing the tax incentive therefore costs the government approximately $235 per senior in foregone tax 
revenue. 
 
6.2. Savings on Medicaid funds 
We next estimate the savings in Medicaid expenses that would result from the increased take-up of private LTC 
insurance due to the tax incentive. Medicaid's LTC expenditures M for a representative senior are equal to her 
expected lifetime nursing home expenses if she claims Medicaid LTC benefits, minus the income and assets 
that she has to spend down before qualifying for Medicaid:33 
 
M=P(N)P(M)(C−A−I) 
 
where P(N) is the probability of ever using a nursing home conditional on reaching age 65. P(M) is the 
probability of receiving Medicaid LTC benefits conditional on utilizing nursing home services. C is the 
expected lifetime cost of nursing home stays conditional on utilization, and A and I are the amount of assets and 
income that a senior would have to spend down. 
 
The expected lifetime cost of nursing home services conditional on utilization is 
 
 
 
where n is the number of years of nursing home stays needed, C0 is the annual cost of stays measured at t = 0, 
and p is the annual growth rate in the real price of care. 
 
An individual has to spend down her income and assets beyond the income and asset disregards allowed by the 
government before Medicaid begins to pay. Since disregards differ substantially on the basis of marital status 
(apart from state of residence, and income and asset levels at the time of application), we calculate the amount 
of assets and income that a representative senior has to spend down, weighted by marital status, to be 
 
 
 
where P(S) is the probability of being single at the time of entering a nursing home. A0S and A0M represent the 
average asset levels for single and married individuals at the time when they apply for Medicaid.34 AS and AM 
are the asset disregards allowed for a single and married individual. The corresponding parameters for income 
spend-down are similarly defined. 
 
Medicaid's savings after implementing the tax incentive are therefore: 
 
 
 
We choose parameter values as follows. We set P(M) = 0.5, the probability that a representative senior would 
rely on Medicaid to pay for her nursing home expenses conditional on utilization (Norton, 2000). ΔP(M), the 
change in this probability as a result of the tax incentive, is equal to the increased probability that a senior takes 
up LTC insurance due to the tax incentive, multiplied by the probability that she would have to rely on 
Medicaid otherwise. ΔP(M) therefore is equal to ΔP(L)P(I)P(M). In Section 3, we estimate that the tax 
incentive increased P(L) by 0.033 for the 16% of seniors who itemized medical expenses. We therefore set 
ΔP(M) = 0.033 * 0.16 * 0.5 = 0.00264. We further assume a uni-sex probability of a 65-year old ever having a 
nursing home stay to be 0.36 and an average length of stay conditional on utilization to be 1.7 years, which we 
round to 2.35 We assume an annual cost C0 of $41,756 and a real price growth rate p of 0.04.36,37 
 
We estimate the other income and asset parameters using data from the AHEAD cohort. Married individuals 
had a mean income of $21,085 and non-housing wealth of $59,672 prior to entering a nursing home while 
single individuals had a mean income of $8859 and non-housing wealth of $1253. We assign these values to 
I0M, A0M, I0S, and A0S.38 70% of nursing home residents in the AHEAD cohort were single the year before 
entering, so P(S) = 0.7. We further set AS = $2000, AM = $82,468, IS = $960, IM = $24,000, reflecting the federal 
maximum income and asset disregards when an individual applies for Medicaid benefits (Brown et al., 2007). 
 
Medicaid's savings is therefore 
 
 
 
6.3. Discussion 
The tax incentive therefore leads to a net revenue loss of $144 per senior, the difference between the loss in tax 
revenue of $235 and the savings on Medicaid funds of $91. An extrapolation of our estimates suggests that an 
above-the-line tax deduction would lead to an even larger net revenue loss of $898 per senior.39 
 
This calculation may actually understate the net loss for several reasons. First, we assume a real price growth of 
nursing home stays of 0.04. If we instead use 0.03, which is the actual growth rate in the real price of care 
averaged over 2002–2007, the net loss becomes $160 per senior. Second, we use non-housing wealth when 
calculating the assets that individuals must spend down. Total wealth including housing asset is substantially 
higher: $197,452 for the married or $18,012 for the single. Using total wealth instead of non-housing wealth 
leads to a larger net loss of $172.40 Third, we use the federal maximum income and asset disregards. This 
overstates the savings as the actual amount that an individual (or her spouse) can keep could be considerably 
lower than the federal allowances, depending on her state of residence and initial income and asset levels. Using 
the most stringent state allowances (AM = $16,824, AS = $1500, IM = $16,884, and IS = $360) causes the net loss 
to become $155. Finally, we round the average 1.7 year utilization length to 2 years, which again overstates the 
savings. 
 
We also calculate the values of some of the key parameters needed for the savings of the tax incentive to equal 
the costs and find that they appear unlikely. For example, fixing other parameters, the real annual growth rate of 
nursing home costs would have to be 9%. Such a real price growth persistently over a long period of time is 
quite unlikely. Alternatively, the tax incentive would lead to equal costs and savings if the probability of a 
senior relying on Medicaid for nursing home services rises to higher than one, which is impossible. 
That said, our analysis relies on a number of strong assumptions about individual behaviors as well as parameter 
values. Nonetheless, the robustness of our result suggests that the government is unlikely to achieve fiscal 
balance when using tax incentives to stimulate the private market and ease the burden of LTC expenses on 
Medicaid. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the impact of the favorable tax treatment in the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 on individuals' LTC insurance purchasing decisions. We estimate that the tax 
incentives prescribed in HIPAA induced those eligible for the tax treatment to increase their probability of 
taking up LTC insurance by 3.3 percentage points, or 25% from the baseline. We therefore conclude that people 
did respond to the tax incentive prescribed in HIPAA. However, this tax incentive did not substantially increase 
the total market size for private LTC insurance. Moreover, our estimates imply that an above-the-line deduction 
would only expand the ownership rate of LTC insurance among the elderly to 13%, if we assume similar 
responses to tax incentives from the general population. 
 
We also find that the demand for LTC insurance is very price elastic, with a price elasticity of around −  3.9 
when the overall ownership rate of LTC insurance is low. Finally, we find that the loss in tax revenue from 
granting the tax incentive exceeds the reduction in Medicaid expenditures, suggesting that from a fiscal point of 
view, it is not cost-effective to use tax subsidies to expand the private LTC insurance market. 
 
Limitations of our analysis provide directions for future research. Estimating elasticity using a more refined 
measure of individuals' federal marginal income tax rates may prove fruitful. Additionally, future research could 
examine the effectiveness of state-level incentives in promoting the private LTC insurance market. 
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Berliant, Steve Buccola, Edward Greenberg, Jeremy Jackson, Mindy Marks, Bruce Petersen, Michael Plotzke 
and Paul Rothstein for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are our own. Partial financial support from 
the CRES, Washington University is acknowledged. 
1. Examples of options provided in Abt Associates (2001) include “maintenance of current law, the 
expansion of Medicare to cover LTC, mandatory private insurance, refundable tax credits to encourage 
growth in the private LTC insurance market, policy that provides relief from Medicaid eligibility 
requirements for individuals who purchase LTC insurance.” 
2. The factors may include individual myopia, misconceptions about the extent of the public insurance 
coverage, informal care provided by family and friends, and a Medicaid crowding-out effect (see 
Norton, 2000 for a review). 
3. Individuals in our sample were between 55 and 65 in 1996, largely conforming to the prime buying age 
of 55–69 for LTC insurance (HIAA, 2000). The correlation of medical itemizing status between 
consecutive years is about 0.5 in our sample, supporting our view that itemizing is somewhat predictable 
for this age group. 
4. Brown and Finkelstein (2008) estimate that 27% of 65 year-old men and 44% of 65 year-old women 
would enter a nursing home at some point in their life, with 12% of men and 22% of women who enter 
one spending more than 3 years there. 
5. Nearly all the private LTC insurance policies in the market are “qualified LTC insurance” as defined by 
HIPAA (Kassner, 2007). 
6. HIPAA's text reads “a qualified long-term care insurance contract shall be treated as an accident and 
health insurance contract”, Title III Subtitle C Part I Sec 7720B (a). 
7. According to the National Compensation survey, 11% of private industry workers are offered LTC 
insurance. However, LTC insurance offered at the workplace is typically funded completely by the 
employees (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004). Therefore, we ignore employer-sponsored LTC insurance 
in the rest of the paper. 
8. In 1996, the caps were $200, $375, $750, $2,000 and $2,500 for individuals 40 or below, between 41 
and 50, between 51 and 60, between 61 and 70 and above 70, respectively. The caps are indexed for 
inflation. In 2006, the caps were $280, $530, $1060, $2830 and $3530 for the respective age groups. See 
the instructions for Form 1040 for 1996 and 2006. 
9. The caps are the same as those in footnote 8 since they apply to both the above-the-line deductions and 
deductions in the form of medical expenses. 
10. The LTC ownership rates in the HRS are 1.1% in the 1992 wave and 1.3% in the 1994, substantially 
lower than the estimates in other analyses for this time period. This possible data flaw has been 
recognized in the literature; for example, see Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), Appendix A. It may have 
originated from the survey design in these two waves in which the questions about LTC insurance were 
asked in the context of “other types of health insurance” that an individual owned. Starting from wave 
1996, a separate set of questions was asked specifically about LTC insurance. 
11. The entire HRS sample includes five cohorts, the HRS, AHEAD, WB, CODA and EBB. 
12. Household income in the RAND HRS is the sum of household capital income, all other household 
income, and the individual incomes of the respondent and her spouse. Individual income includes 
earnings, employer pension or annuity, social disability income and supplemental security income, other 
government transfers, social security retirement, and unemployment or workers compensation. 
Household wealth in RAND HRS is the sum of all wealth components minus all debt, excluding the 
secondary residence. Wealth components include value of primary residence, net value of other real 
estate (excluding the secondary residence), net value of business, net value of vehicles, net value of IRA, 
Keogh accounts, net value of stocks, mutual funds and investment funds, value of CD, government 
savings bonds and T-bills, value of bonds, and all other savings. Debt includes value of all mortgages on 
the primary residence, net value of other home loan on the primary residence, and value of other debts. 
13. Some of the public finance literature on the impact of tax incentives has used tax data, which generally 
gives accurate information on tax price and deduction amounts without involving imputations. For 
example, see Gouveia and Strauss, 2004. However, in a study on LTC insurance ownership, tax data is 
not usable since tax data, which record all the entries on Form 1040, does not contain information on 
LTC insurance. In particular, the total amount of medical expenses is entered as a lump sum on schedule 
A of Form 1040 without being divided into sub-categories, at least during the period that our study 
examines. 
14. 1996 is pre-treatment since HIPAA became effective on January 1, 1997. 
15. In our online Appendix I, we discuss in detail how we define the various measures of medical expenses 
necessary to implement our grouping of the sample and how we impute the hypothetical LTC insurance 
premiums used below (http://artsci.wustl.edu/~dhe). 
16. Data limitations prevent us from obtaining a precise measure of other deductible expenditures, so we do 
not attempt to impute whether adding a hypothetical LTC insurance premium will induce a person to 
itemize deductions instead of taking the standard deduction. 
17. Our online Appendix II presents a theoretical model to justify our division of the sample into these 
groups (http://artsci.wustl.edu/~dhe). 
18. Regressions including the square of income and wealth produce almost identical results. 
19. We group individuals into age groups of five-year intervals, such as 55–59, and 60–64. 
20. The scales used for self-reported health status and memory are as follows: 1 for excellent, 2 for very 
good, 3 for good, 4 for fair and 5 for poor. 
21. On average, an individual holds a LTC insurance policy for more than 10 years before she starts to 
receive benefits. The prime buying age of LTC insurance is from 55 to 69 while the average age of first 
use of a nursing home is 83 (Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), 2000 and [Brown and 
Finkelstein, 2008]). 
22. Including data from the year 1998 makes the estimate of a1 slightly insignificant in most of our 
regressions. 
23. Household real income and wealth are based on 2004 value. 
24. The fact that the first-difference result is similar to our fixed effects results suggests that autocorrelation 
is not responsible for the statistical significance we obtain in Table 2. 
25. Additionally, self-employed people may be less risk averse than the rest of the population. It is therefore 
possible that insurance is less valuable to them, making a relative drop in the price of insurance less 
attractive to this group. 
26. The variable taxprice contains non-classical measurement error since we do not consider state income 
tax, phase out of itemized deductions, the alternative minimum tax, and the caps on the amount of 
premiums that are deductible. See our online Appendix I for a detailed description of how we construct 
the marginal tax rate τ from the RAND HRS and HRS data, as well as a discussion of potential 
measurement errors (http://artsci.wustl.edu/~dhe). 
27. Finkelstein (2002) uses a similar instrument in a study on how tax incentives affect individuals' decision 
to take up supplementary health insurance. 
28. 13% is the ownership rate among individuals included in the regression with full controls, which does 
not include those with missing values for one or more control variables or the self-employed individuals 
excluded from the regressions. The 12% ownership rate for itemizers reported in Table 1 does not drop 
these individuals. 
29. 0.21 is the average marginal tax rate for the medical itemizers who own LTC insurance. $2063 is the 
average annual LTC insurance premium paid by medical itemizers, excluding individuals paying a zero 
premium or an annual premium above $50,000. 0.19 is the average ownership rate of LTC insurance 
among medical itemizers, 0.16 is proportion of medical itemizers in the sample. 
30. The average real growth rate of nursing homes costs over the period 2002–2007 is 0.029, according to 
Metlife's annual nursing home costs surveys (authors' calculation) ([Metlife, 2002], [Metlife, 2003], 
[Metlife, 2004], [Metlife, 2005], [Metlife, 2006] and [Metlife, 2007]). Since premiums ultimately reflect 
the expected costs multiplied by a loading factor, they should grow at a similar rate as costs if we 
assume a constant probability of utilization and loading factor. 
31. In the AHEAD cohort, the average LTC insurance owner purchases a policy at age 65, and the average 
age to use a nursing home is 83. These numbers are similar to the corresponding estimates in HIAA 
(2000) and Brown and Finkelstein (2008). Also note that many LTC insurance policies carry waivers to 
allow the policyholders to stop paying premiums once they start receiving benefits. 
32. The average real interest rate on treasury notes and bonds with a 10-year maturity is 0.027 over 2004–
2008 and that of those with a 20-year maturity is 0.034 (OMB, 2008). 
33. For simplicity, we ignore other LTC expenses like home health benefits covered by Medicaid and most 
private LTC insurance given that these other expenses are much smaller than the nursing home 
expenses. 
34. Our use of income and asset levels at the time of application is reasonable if seniors do not transfer or 
hide assets in anticipation of applying for Medicaid benefits, or if Medicaid does not catch them doing 
so. To our knowledge, there is no reliable evidence for either. We however acknowledge that these are 
strong assumptions. 
35. The probability of ever using a nursing home is 0.44 for a 65 year-old female and the average length of 
stay is two years; the corresponding numbers for a male are 0.27 and 1.3 years (Brown and Finkelstein, 
2008 J. Brown and A. Finkelstein, The interaction of public and private insurance: Medicaid and the 
long-term care insurance market, American Economic Review 98 (3) (2008), pp. 1083–1102. The uni-
sex utilization probability that we use is the average of the utilization probabilities of the two genders, 
weighted by the proportions of the two genders in the population in 2016, the time when a typical 
individual in the HRS cohort would utilize nursing homes. The Census Bureau (2004) predicts that 53% 
of the population of age 65–69 would be female in 2016. The uni-sex length of stay is obtained 
similarly. 
36. The average price of a one-year stay in a nursing home is $52,195 in 2002 (Metlife, 2002). Since 
Medicaid on average reimburses about 80% of the market price, 80% of $52,192 gives $41,756. 
(Ideally, we would like to use the price in 2000, which is the base year of our calculation, if we could 
find a reliable price for that year). 
37. Recall that the average real growth rate of nursing homes costs over the period 2002–2007 is 0.029 (see 
footnote 31). We use 0.04 to err on the side of overestimating the savings. 
38. We assume that the HRS and AHEAD cohorts have similar average income and asset levels at the old 
age of using nursing homes, even though we realize that actual income and asset accumulation patterns 
may be different across cohorts. 
39. For the above-the-line deduction, we drop the probability of being a medical itemizer of 0.16 from both 
the cost and savings calculations. 
40. Note that some states put a lien on the housing wealth of Medicaid LTC beneficiaries (Brown and 
Finkelstein, 2008). This means at least for these states, the relevant asset parameter should be the total 
wealth instead of the non-housing wealth.  
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